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TERM OF THE COURT

Moreover, the court held that once the certificate of title is
passed the warranty provisions of chapter 342 of the Wisconsin
Statutes preclude the application of the Uniform Commercial
Code with respect to a warranty exclusion. The transfer of an
interest in an automobile may precede the conveyance of the
certificate, and under these circumstances the Uniform Commercial Code and its warranties would be applicable.'"' But
once the certificate of title is transferred, the Code no longer
applies and the seller is held to the warranty required by section 342.15(1).1' 1
This conclusion, while consonant with the intendment of
the Wisconsin Vehicle Code, nonetheless introduces the possibility of an automobile purchaser being left in the very situation the statute attempts to avoid. For example, if the title
certificate to the automobile is withheld by the seller even after
delivery of the automobile, the purchaser is protected only if
the seller's warranty of title under section 402.401 of the Commercial Code has not been modified or excluded.
DAvW B. BILLING

CRIMINAL JUSTICE
I. PRE-TRIAL STAGE
Since the decision was rendered, Hadley v. State' has been
used extensively to successfully argue denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial based on the Barker v. Wingo2 test.
Fosterv. State3 began the predictable trend to narrow the scope
of Hadley. In Foster,the defendant was arraigned on two felony
charges on April 26, 1971. Trial was set for May 27, 1971, but
was adjourned by stipulation, and the defendant specifically
121. Id. at 765, 235 N.W.2d at 463.
122. Id. at 766, 235 N.W.2d at 464.
1. 66 Wis. 2d 350, 225 N.W.2d 461 (1975).
2. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). In Barker the court noted that a defendant's constitutional
right to speedy trial can be determined only on an ad hoc basis in which the conduct
of the prosecution and the defendant are weighed and balanced. Among factors which
courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived
of his right are length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of
his right, and prejudice to the defendant.
3. 70 Wis. 2d 72, 233 N.W.2d 411 (1975).
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waived his right to speedy trial. Eighteen months later, the
defendant entered a guilty plea, and appealed the conviction
asserting his denial to a speedy trial. For six of the eighteen
months the defendant was an absconder. The court held that
the period of time while an absconder "is not to be considered
as a delay related to his right to speedy trial."' Also, after the
defendant's apprehension, it took two months to return him to
Wisconsin because he had charges pending in six other states.
Upon his return to Wisconsin, the defendant spent the next
three months awaiting trial on a federal charge. This period of
time, the court ruled, should also not be considered in a claim
of denial of the right to a speedy trial. "The one-after-another
trial of resultant charges is a consequence of the wide-ranging
criminal activities that does not constitute a denial of speedy
trial on any one of them." 5
The court found, without any reference to the Hadley rule,
that under these circumstances the delay was not unreasonable
and thus further analysis of the factors in the Barker balancing
test was unnecessary.
The Barker test surfaced again in State v. Rogers.6 The
defendant was charged with obstructing an officer and five
motor vehicle code violations stemming from a one-car accident, which occurred eighteen months earlier. At that time the
defendant was district attorney for the county in which the
accident occurred. The trial court dismissed the complaint ruling that the delay between the date of the offense and the
institution of criminal proceedings deprived the defendant of
due process based on the balancing test of Barker.The supreme
court found it inappropriate to apply the Barker test to a prearrest delay problem. 7 Rather, the standard established in United
States v. Marion8 governed. That standard required that actual
prejudice to the defendant's case must be shown to have resulted from the delay. The United States Supreme Court, however, stated, "[W]e need not, and could not now, determine
when and in what circumstances actual prejudice resulting
from pre-accusation delays requires the dismissal of the prose4. Id. at 14, 233 N.W.2d at 412.
5. Id. at 15, 233 N.W.2d at 413.
6. 70 Wis. 2d 160, 233 N.W.2d 480 (1975).
7. Id. at 165, 233 N.W.2d at 483.
8. 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
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cution." The majority on the Wisconsin Supreme Court apparently felt that this language required that a second prong be
added to the Marion standard: that there be intentional prosecutorial delay. In dissent, Chief Justice Wilkie stated that
Marion should be interpeted to mean that actual prejudice
alone can be sufficient to warrant dismissal."0 The court then
examined the record and noted that any claim of actual prejudice was unsubstantiated. It held that even if the allegations
of inconvenience, indignity, anxiety and financial loss resulting
from the delay and the undue publicity surrounding it were
true, "they do not rise to the level of intentional government
action to gain tactical advantage or to harass.""
II.

TRIAL CONSIDERATIONS
2

In Peters v. State,1 a conviction was reversed in the interest
of justice based on the prejudicial joinder of two charges. The
defendant was charged with theft, burglary, and obstructing an
officer in violation of Wisconsin Statutes section 946.41(2)(b).
The charges of burglary and obstructing an officer were tried
together. The joinder was technically proper under the general
rule that, if evidence of each crime is admissible in regard to
the other crime, the two crimes may be tried together.'3 The
court emphasized, however, that the fabrication of an alibi
could not be relied upon by the State as affirmative proof of
any of the elements of the burglary charge. "The state must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of the crime of
burglary by evidence independent and separate from the evidence relating to fabrication of alibi."" The court then pointed
out that the danger of prejudice in the joinder of these charges
could be overcome by a proper cautionary instruction, as was
illustrated in United States v. Pacente. 5 Since only part of this
9. Id. at 324.
10. 70 Wis. 2d at 167, 233 N.W.2d at 484 (Wilkie, C.J., dissenting).
11. 70 Wis. 2d at 166-67, 233 N.W.2d at 484.
12. 70 Wis. 2d 22, 233 N.W.2d 420 (1975).
13. Bailey v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 331, 222 N.W.2d 871 (1974).
14. 70 Wis. 2d at 31, 233 N.W.2d at 425.
15. 503 F.2d 543, 547-48 (7th Cir. 1974). The approved instruction reads as follows:
The indictment that I am going to refer to in a few moments is not evidence of
the defendant's guilt, it is simply, as I told you before [presumably on voir
dire], the manner by which the government accuses a person of a crime and
you should not be prejudice[d] against a defendant because an indictment has
been returned against him. . ..
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instruction was given, the court ordered a new trial in the interest of justice pursuant to Wisconsin Statutes section 251.09.
Curiously, the supreme court hinted that the charge of obstructing an officer may have been a case of overcharging. The
decision noted that previous cases in Wisconsin on convictions
for obstructing an officer had always involved physical abuse
of the officer while performing his official duties. 6 The court
admonished,
[B]efore such a charge should be made under sec.
946.41(2)(b), Stats., the district attorney should have sound
reasons for believing that statements made by a suspected
defendant to the police in terms of an alibi were made for the
purpose of deceiving and misleading the police, and not simply out of a good-faith desire to defend against an accusation
of crime. 7
Whether one can actually distinguish between these two motives ought to provide some entertaining courtroom argument.
8 In
Another conviction was reversed in State v. Spraggin.1
this case the defendant was originally charged with two separate felony counts of receiving stolen property, namely a revolver and a television set. The trial court, on motion of the
State, consolidated the two counts into a single felony on the
State's theory that both items were received by the defendant
in one transaction. Despite the evidence that the two items
were received separately, and that the revolver had a cash
value of $80 and the television a value of $100, the defendant
was convicted of a felony. The supreme court, relying on the
rationale set forth in a Florida case, Hamilton v. State, 9 held
that the defendant was convicted of merely two misdemeanors:
Receiving or concealing different articles of stolen property at different times on separate and unconnected occaYou are instructed to consider the testimony given by the defendant Pacente
before the Grand Jury on February 22nd only as evidence under Count 2 of the
indictment and you should not consider it as evidence on any other count in the
indictment. ...
Now, there are two counts in this indictment, and, as I have told you, each
one charges a separate crime. You should consider each one separately. The
defendant's guilt or innocence of the crime charged in one count should not
affect your verdict on the other count.
16. 70 Wis. 2d at 29, 233 N.W.2d at 424.
17. Id.
18. 71 Wis. 2d 604, 239 N.W.2d 297 (1976).
19. 129 Fla. 219, 176 So. 89, 92 (1937).

19771

TERM OF THE COURT

sions, constitute separate offenses and cannot be prosecuted
as one crime, in one count, though all of the property is afterwards found in the possession of the defendant at the same
time and place."
The court pointed out that the state rashly assumed that a
single felonious transaction had conclusively occurred, and
that each stolen item exceeded $100 in value. The court, however, ruled that these were jury questions.
This decision also established a rule for determining
"value" of stolen property in the context of receiving stolen
property. "Value. . .is usually considered to mean 'fair market value' at the time of reception."'" In determining this value,
such measures as market value at the time of theft, original
retail cost, and expert's testimony on market value may be
considered, but these evaluations should indicate that "the
original cost may not necessarily be equatable with the appropriate market figure for the period when the goods are charged
as received." 22
A note should be made of the following change in appellate
procedure. Failure to raise issues in the circuit court on misdemeanor appeals from the county court constitutes a waiver of
the right to review those issues on appeal to the supreme court.
In State v. Killory,2 the defendant was convicted of a misdemeanor, and appealed to the circuit court as provided by Wisconsin Statutes section 974.01 on the issues of the constitutionality of a statute and the sentence imposed. Appeal to the
supreme court was from the order of the circuit court affirming
the judgment of the county court. The defendant sought review
of questions relating to trial court denial of a motion to dismiss,
jury instructions, admissibility of certain evidentiary items,
and the sufficiency of evidence. None of these matters had been
presented to the circuit court for consideration. The supreme
court denied the State's motion to strike portions of the defendant's brief relating to these four issues, but continued:
"Henceforth, however, such a motion will be granted unless in
a proper case and for reasons of judicial administration and
policy it is necessary to consider new issues raised for the first
20.
21.
22.
23.

71 Wis. 2d at 613, 239 N.W.2d at 308.
Id. at 620, 239 N.W.2d at 308.
Id. at 621, 239 N.W.2d at 309.
73 Wis. 2d 400, 243 N.W.2d 475 (1976).
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time on appeal to this court."24 The court indicated that the
purpose for directing appeal of misdemeanors to the circuit
court was to provide for economic and orderly administration
of justice.25 Failure to raise all issues to the circuit court severely hampered the effectiveness of such a procedure.
III.

POST TRIAL MOTIONS

In Jones (Hollis) v. State,2" the court clarified procedural
questions that have reoccurred regarding motions for reconsideration of sentence under the rule of Hayes v. State. 7 The
defendant originally moved for modification of sentence within
ninety days of his sentence. That motion was denied. When the
defendant again sought modification more than one year later,
the trial court apparently felt it lacked jurisdiction to consider
the motion. The supreme court took the opportunity to set
forth the following procedure: The Wuensch" rule allows the
trial court to review its own sentence for abuse of discretion,
i.e., unduly harsh or unconscionable sentences, even if no "new
factors" were present. The ninety day limit of Hayes is to be
strictly followed under a Wuensch motion. On the other hand,
the court reiterated that the ninety day limit under Hayes was
regulatory and not jurisdictional on the exercise of the trial
court's inherent power to modify its sentence at any time providing "new factors" were present. 9 The phrase "new factor,"
as defined in another case this term,
refers to a fact or set of facts highly relevant to the imposition
of sentence, but not known to the trial judge at the time of
original sentencing, either because it was not then in existence or because, even though it was then in existence, it was
unknowingly overlooked by all of the parties."
24. Id. at 410, 243 N.W.2d at 482.
25. Id. at 411, 243 N.W.2d at 482, citing Harms v. State, 36 Wis. 2d 282, 286, 153
N.W.2d 78 (1967).
26. 70 Wis. 2d 62, 233 N.W.2d 441 (1975).
27. 46 Wis. 2d 93, 175 N.W.2d 625 (1970). The Hayes rule in substance states that
the time within which to move for modification of a sentence imposed on or after July
1, 1970, should be 90 days from the date of sentencing. The court, however, need not

decide the motion within this period.
28. State v. Wuensch, 69 Wis. 2d 467, 230 N.W.2d 665 (1975).
29. 70 Wis. 2d at 72, 233 N.W.2d at 446-47, citing State v. Foellmi, 57 Wis. 2d 572,
205 N.W.2d 144 (1973).
30. Rosado v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 280, 234 N.W.2d 69 (1975).
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In Mulkovich v. State,3 ' prejudicial error was found in the
refusal by the trial court to permit substitution of the defendant's retained counsel for the purposes of sentencing. The
supreme court noted that even though the adequacy of trial
counsel was not questioned, improperly forcing a defendant to
accept an attorney not of his own choice in cases involving
retained, rather than appointed counsel, would violate due process and render a sentence void.3 2 The court formulated this
guideline: trial courts abuse their discretion by refusing a request for retained counsel or for substitution of counsel when
there is no evidence that the proposed counsel is inadequate
and there is no evidence that a change of counsel is made for
33
the purpose of delay.
IV.

SENTENCING AND PROBATION

The defendant in Kubart v. State4 received a prison sentence for burglary convictions. Using the equal protection argument asserted in Byrd v. State, 5 he sought credit for the four
days spent in the county jail awaiting transfer to prison. The
defendant attacked the constitutionality of Wisconsin Statutes
section 973.15(1) 31 which specifically precludes crediting such
"dead" time toward the term of sentence. There was no expansion of the much-litigated perimeters of the Byrd decision in
this case. The court found no denial of equal protection to the
indigent since even a wealthy person released on bail under the
terms of the statute would not receive credit for the time await31. 73 Wis. 2d 464, 243 N.W.2d 198 (1976).
32. 73 Wis. 2d at 474, 475, 243 N.W.2d at 203, 204, citing Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60 (1942) and Reickauer v. Cunningham, 299 F.2d 170 (4th Cir. 1962).
33. 73 Wis. 2d at 474, 243 N.W.2d at 203, 204.
34. 70 Wis. 2d 94, 233 N.W.2d 404 (1975).
35. 65 Wis. 2d 415, 424, 222 N.W.2d 696, 701 (1974). In Byrd the court, under the
rationale of equal protection, held that a defendant must be given credit for time spent
in custody prior to conviction to the extent that such time added to sentence imposed
exceeds the maximum sentence permitted for such offense. Such time spent in custody, however, must be the result of the criminal charge for which a prison or jail
sentence is imposed or as a result of the conduct on which such charge is based. In
addition, such custody must be the result of the defendant's financial inability to post
bail. Byrd did not, however, deal with the question of post conviction custody.
36. Wis. STAT. § 973.15(1) (1973) states as follows:
All sentences to the Wisconsin state prisons shall be for one year or more.
Except as otherwise provided in this section, all sentences commence at noon
on the day of sentence, but time which elapses after sentence while the defendant is in the county jail or at large on bail shall not be computed as any part
of his term of imprisonment.
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ing transfer to an institution.3 7
The court also held that the four day delay was reasonable
in light of the time required to make necessary transportation
arrangements. This rationale follows Mitchell v. State,38 where
a two-and-one-half week period elapsed between the defendant's return to jail from a hospital commitment for a presentence work-up under the Sex Crimes Act and his actual
sentencing. This delay was held not unreasonable and not violative of either due process or equal protection. Admitting that
the test of reasonableness in a post-sentencing situation was
difficult to apply, the supreme court, in Kubart, did indicate
that an unreasonable delay could give rise to constitutional
problems. It urged the legislature to amend Wisconsin Statutes
section 973.15(1) and incorporate that portion of the American
Bar Association's Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures9 which allows credit for time spent in
custody after sentencing awaiting transfer to an institution."
This suggestion was reinforced in the context of a probation
revocation in State ex rel Solie v. Schmidt.4 Solie was confined
in the Milwaukee County jail from approximately October 20,
1973 until January 10, 1974 awaiting the decision that his probation was revoked on the ground he left the state without the
prior consent of his probation officer. The supreme court ruled
that the period of time Solie spent in jail was unreasonable,
and due process required that the eighty-two days be deducted
from the two year sentence. 2 Apparently applying the Byrd
rationale, the court reasoned that the stayed two year sentence
to prison was the maximum period Solie could be incarcerated,
since a revocation could not increase or decrease the sentence
37. 70 Wis. 2d at 104, 233 N.W.2d at 410.
38. 69 Wis. 2d 695, 230 N.W.2d 884 (1975).
39. Section 3.6(a):
Credit against the maximum term and any minimum term should be given
to a defendant for all time spent in custody as a result of the criminal charge
for which a prison sentence is imposed or as a result of the conduct on which
such a charge is based. This should specifically include credit for time spent in
custody prior to trial, during trial, pending sentence, pending the resolution of
an appeal, and prior to arrival at the institution to which the defendant has been
committed.
This is consistent with the federal statute that gives credit for the time spent
awaiting transfer. 18 U.S.C. § 3568.
40. 70 Wis. 2d at 106, 233 N.W.2d at 411.
41. 73 Wis. 2d 76, 242 N.W.2d 244 (1976).
42. Id. at 82, 242 N.W.2d at 247.
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imposed by the court.
This decision creates more uncertainty in this area. A strict
application of the Byrd principle would limit inquiry only to
those situations where a "maximum" sentence had been imposed, i.e., where the trial court imposed a prison sentence but
stayed execution and placed the defendant on probation. Equal
protection challenges, however, will arise from parolees and
those on "straight" probation. For that reason and in response
to Circuit Court Judge Robert Curley's comment 3 in this case,
the legislature should provide credit for jail time in all revocation cases.
Three cases this term clarified the misconception surrounding the use of confinement in the county jail as a condition of
probation under Wisconsin Statutes section 973.09(4). The
confusion usually arose from a failure to clearly distinguish
between a sentence under the Huber Law, section 56.08(1), and
probation ordered pursuant to section 973.09(4). This latter
section provides that a sentenced offender may be placed on
probation with the condition that he be confined to the county
jail between the hours of his employment.
In State v. Schaller4 the defendant was charged with having intentionally escaped from the custody of the LaCrosse
County sheriff, contrary to Wisconsin Statutes section
946.42(2) (c).15 He was in jail pursuant to section 973.09(4) having received probation on a burglary conviction with the condition that he be confined in the county jail between the hours
of his employment. The charge of escape resulted from his
43. "And I am going to say it again for the record, we have been screaming about
it because we sit here and see the inequities that result by the fact that the State does
not provide a sufficient number of hearing officers." Id. at 81-82, 242 N.W.2d at 247.
44. 70 Wis. 2d 107, 233 N.W.2d 416 (1975).
45. Wis. STAT. § 946.42(5) (1973) provides in part as follows:
(5) In this section:
(a) "Escape" means to leave in any manner without lawful permission or
authority;
(b) "Custody" includes without limitation actual custody of an institution
or of a peace officer or institution guard and constructive custody of prisoners
temporarily outside the institution whether for the purpose of work or medical
care or otherwise. Under s. 56.08(6) it means, without limitation, that of the
sheriff of the county to which the prisoner was transferred after conviction. It
does not include the custody of a probationer or parolee by the department of
health and social services or a probation or parole officer unless the prisoner is
in actual custody after revocation of his probation or parole or to enforce discipline or to prevent him from absconding. . ..
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failure to return to the jail for over twenty-four hours after his
release for work.
In concluding that a probationer in such a situation could
not be charged under the criminal statutes with escape during
the release period, the supreme court held that custody of the
probationer during the release time lay solely with the probation department, and not with the sheriff. Consequently, this
infraction should be treated as a violation of the condition of
probation. "There being no basis for the sheriff to deny or
revoke their probation and enforce imprisonment, 'constructive
custody' does not exist in the release periods."4
The sheriff's custody of the probationer is coextensive with
that of the probation department during the period of an individual's actual confinement in the jail. Wisconsin Statutes section 973.09(4) prescribes that a probationer is subject to all the
rules of the jail and the discipline of the sheriff. Under these
circumstances, an escape from the confines of the jail rather
than absconding during the release period would constitute
escape under section 946.42. 4 1 The provisions of section
973.09(4) are to be distinguished from the Huber Law privilege,
which is a sentence to the county jail, and places the prisoner
under the sole custody of the sheriff. Whereas probation is an
alternative to a sentence according to Prue v. State,48 incarceration as a condition of probation is not a sentence and does not
transform probation into a sentence. Under the Huber Law
statute, the sheriff, as sole custodian, has the necessary power
to impose confinement rather than allow release. The sheriff
thus has the constructive custody referred to in section
946.42(5)(b).
The importance of this distinction surfaced in Yingling v.
State.-9 There, the trial court stayed a two-year prison sentence, placed the defendant on probation and sentenced him to
the county jail under the Huber Law for the first six months of
probation. Subsequently, the trial court treated the incarceration as a condition of probation, revoked the probation, and
imposed the original sentence. The probationer raised the
question of double jeopardy, claiming that he was punished
46.
47.
48.
49.

70 Wis. 2d at 113-14, 233 N.W.2d at 419.
Id. at 113, 233 N.W.2d at 419.
63 Wis. 2d 109, 114, 216 N.W.2d 43, 45 (1974).
73 Wis. 2d 438, 243 N.W.2d 420 (1976).
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twice for the same offense. Although the case was moot since
the probationer had been released from custody, the supreme
court emphasized that these two statutory provisions could not
be used interchangeably without running the risk of an inappropriate sentence in excess of statutory authority or of a "colorable" claim of double joepardy. The crux is again the fact
that Huber Law privileges are a sentence, while confinement
to the county jail as a condition of probation is not a sentence.
"Accordingly, where a criminal case is disposed of under the
Huber Law, the defendant has in fact received a sentence, and
any attempt to alter that disposition by the reimposition of
criminal sanctions may well result in a double joepardy situation."50
The third case, State v. Gloudemans, 51 held that Wisconsin
Statutes section 973.09(4) requires mandatory work-release
privileges upon confinement in the county jail as a condition
of probation. The court ruled that the trial court exceeded its
authority under section 973.09(4) when, as a condition of probation, it ordered the defendant confined in the county jail for
one year without the work-release privileges.52
V.

PAROLE AND PAROLEE RIGHTS
Goulette53 subjected the refusal

of the parole
Since State v.
board to grant discretionary parole to judicial review by writ
of certiorari and Morrissey v. Brewer"4 applied due process requirements to parole revocations, the area of parole and parolee
rights has experienced increased litigation. Three cases in this
area were particularly noteworthy this term.
In State ex rel Tyznik v. Department of Health and Social
Services,-" the court declared that within sixty days of the date
of its decision, the parole board must formulate criteria and
standards for determining whether or not to grant discretionary
parole to an inmate. The court also required the parole board,
when denying a parole application, to spell out its reasons for
the denial and support the same by particular evidence in the
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 440, 243 N.W.2d at 421.
73 Wis. 2d 514, 243 N.W.2d 220 (1976).
Id. at 517-18, 243 N.W.2d at 221-22.
65 Wis. 2d 207, 222 N.W.2d 622 (1974).
408 U.S. 471 (1972).
71 Wis. 2d 169, 238 N.W.2d 66 (1976).
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prisoner's records and the parole proceedings. 6 These requirements will facilitate judicial review and satisfy due process by
balancing the interest of the individual inmate in the expectation of conditional liberty under discretionary parole with the
interest of the state in maintaining the orderly administration
of the parole system. 57 The reasons given by the parole board
for denial of Tyznik's application were:
(1) "that parole at this time would depreciate the seriousness
of this man's criminal behavior," (2) "there is reasonable
probability that this man would not comply with the requirements of parole because of his poor adjustment while under
previous supervision," and (3) "continued confinement is
necessary
to protect the public from further criminal activ58
ity.)
The court noted that these reasons were adequate to support
the parole board's decision to defer Tyznik's parole for twelve
months, but only because the court had the full record to consider. The standard laid down by the court requires greater
specificity from the parole board.
In Putnam v. McCauley,59 Wisconsin Statutes section
53.11(7)(b) was found violative of the equal protection clause
insofar as it failed to provide for the exercise of discretion by
the division of corrections to allow credit for street time for
mandatory release violators.
The issue was raised in a declaratory judgment action by
the plaintiff, who received a sentence of an indeterminate term
not to exceed five years beginning July 17, 1969. This sentence
was revoked after the defendant received a discretionary parole
and passed his mandatory release date while on the street.
Upon his return to prison, the defendant was given a new discharge date of June 26, 1975, nearly one year longer than his
original sentence.
When a criminal defendant is sentenced to prison, a mandatory release date is computed by crediting the defendant
with all the statutory" and extra" good time that can be
earned. This period sets the date on which the individual must
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 173, 238 N.W.2d at 68.
Id. at 172, 238 N.W.2d at 68.
Id. at 173-74, 238 N.W.2d at 68.
70 Wis. 2d 256, 234 N.W.2d 75 (1975).
Wis. STAT. § 53.11 (1973).
Wis. STAT. § 53.12 (1973).
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be released from prison, barring forfeiture of good time by misconduct. If a parolee reaches his mandatory release date on the
street, he is simply continued on parole. The problem arises
when a parolee who has reached his mandatory release date has
his parole revoked. Wisconsin Statutes section 53.11(7)(b) requires that upon revocation such parolee must "serve the remainder of his sentence" which "shall be deemed to be the
amount by which his original sentence was reduced by good
time. 6' 2 Thus, if an inmate's original sentence were reduced by
two years good time, he would be required to serve two years
upon revocation of his parole after the mandatory release date
regardless of how close he was to his discharge date.
The court held that the statute failed an equal protection
scrutiny because no rational basis justified the statute's distinction between the due process protections afforded a discretionary parole violator versus a mandatory release violator.
Presently, due process procedures, as mandated by Wolff v.
McDonnell6 3 and Steele v. Gray, 4 are available to the discretionary parole violator. A case-by-case decision is made to determine the amount of good time that is forfeited after parole
revocation. Putnam extended this due process protection to
mandatory release violators. The narrow effect of the decision
should be noted. The decision required only that discretion be
exercised by the division of corrections. This eliminated the
automatic loss of all good time earned; however, the court did
not explain how that discretion should be exercised. Conceivably, the division could determine that a particular mandatory
release violator should serve his entire remaining sentence anyway.
The constititionality of the Out of State Parolee Supervision Act, 5 was upheld in State ex rel Niederer v. Cady.66 The
Act allows a probationer or parolee convicted within a "sending
state" to reside in another state while on probation or parole
pursuant to a compact between the two states. While in the
"receiving state," the parolee is supervised by the appropriate
probation or parole authorities of that state.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Wis. STAT. § 53.11(7)(b) (1973).
418 U.S. 539 (1974).
64 Wis. 2d 422, 219 N.W.2d 312, 223 N.W.2d 614 (1974).
Wis. STAT. § 57.13 (1973).
72 Wis. 2d 311, 240 N.W.2d 626 (1976).
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In this case the petitioner, a Wisconsin parolee, took advantage of the privilege extended by section 57.13 to hold a job in
Minnesota. His subsequent conduct resulted in a return to
Wisconsin and a revocation of his parole. When his petition for
a writ of habeas corpus was quashed, Niederer challenged section 57.13 on three grounds: that he was denied an extradition
hearing prior to his return to Wisconsin, that this denial violated the equal protection clause, and that under Morrissey v.
Brewer87 he was entitled to a preliminary hearing at the location in Minnesota where the incident occurred that triggered
the revocation.
Section 57.13(3)68 in particular was scrutinized since it specifically abrogated the necessity of an extradition hearing. The
only formality required under section 57.13(3) for the retaking
of an out-of-state parolee is that the official from the "sending
state" who desires to retake the parolee must establish his
authority and the identity of the parolee. The court held that
the rights afforded under extradition acts are statutory and are
granted only to the asylum state. "The statutory extradition
process is a right conferred upon the asylum state whereby, as
a sovereign, it may assert its rights to protect its own citizens
or persons within its boundaries from unjust criminal actions
that may be brought by a sister sovereign state."69 A constitutional issue exists, however, if the state procedures constitute
a denial of equal protection. The equal protection argument
developed by Niederer was premised on the fact that an absconder is entitled to an extradition hearing, while a parolee
under section 57.13 is not. This challenge was dismissed by the
67. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
68. WIs. STAT. § 57.13(3) (1973) provides as follows:
That the duly accredited officers of a sending state may at all times enter a
receiving state and there apprehend and retake any person on probation or
parole. For that purpose no formalities will be required other than establishing
the authority of the officer and the identity of the person to be retaken. All legal
requirements to obtain extradition of fugitives from justice are expressly waived
on the part of states party thereto, as to such persons. The decision of the
sending state to retake a person on probation or parole shall be conclusive upon
and not reviewable within the receiving state; provided, however, that if at the
time when a state seeks to retake a probationer or parolee there should be
pending against him within the receiving state any criminal charge, or he should
be suspected of having committed within such state a criminal offense, he shall
not be retaken without the consent of the receiving state until discharged from
prosecution or from imprisonment for such offense.
69. 72 Wis. 2d at 317, 240 N.W.2d at 630.
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court on the ground that a rational basis for distinction between the two groups could be made. The purpose of an extradition hearing is to identify an individual as the person wanted
by another state. A parolee under section 57.13 has been so
identified in advance by the receiving state consciously accepting the obligation of supervision. Since all parolees are treated
alike and all absconders are treated alike, no equal protection
70
violation exists.

The court also pointed out that Morrissey v. Brewer was
applicable to the section 57.13 situation. A preliminary determination was required at or near the place where the alleged
parole violation took place to establish that probable cause
existed for believing that the conditions of parole had been
violated. 71 In Niederer, the need for this hearing was obviated
by the fact that the parolee had entered a guilty plea to the
offense on which the revocation was based.
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Societal acceptance of informal living arrangements between unmarried men and women has begun to carry with it
certain legal consequences. Affirming a trial court's finding
that a "de facto" marriage relationship existed between an exwife and another man, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Taake
v. Taake held that the ex-wife's cohabitation with this man
constituted a sufficient change in circumstances to expunge
delinquent alimony payments and terminate the husband's alimony obligation. The supreme court, however, would not bar
future alimony since the wife was not actually married. Other
circumstances could warrant a resumption of alimony in some
degree at a future date.
In 1966 E. Robert Taake and Barbara A. Taake were
granted a divorce. The judgment awarded Mrs. Taake certain
70. Id. at 323, 240 N.W.2d at 633.
71. Id. at 326, 240 N.W.2d at 634-35.

1. 70 Wis. 2d 115, 233 N.W.2d 449 (1975).

